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Abstract—This paper presents a novel pre-shared key (PSK) agreement
scheme to establish a secure connection between a Wi-Fi client and access
point (AP) without prior knowledge of a password. The standard IEEE
802.11 security method, Robust Security Network Association, widely
known as Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) and WPA2, derives a shared
cryptographic key if and only if a user provides an identical password
which an AP possesses, causing of inconvenience of obtaining and entering
the password. In this paper, a proposed scheme, Secure Open AP (SOAP),
adopts two public key algorithms, the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key
exchange algorithm (ECDH) and digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) to
establish a secure connection between a client and an AP without having
prior knowledge of a password. Implementation and experiment results
demonstrate the viability of the proposed scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the wide distribution of mobile devices, Wi-Fi access points
(APs) are becoming more available in public areas. They are mostly
configured to use Open System Authentication (OSA) for clients’
convenience without having to enter a password. However, OSA
provides null authentication and no protection of data traffic [1]
posing security and privacy threats. On the other hand, a more recent
IEEE 802.11 standard defines Robust Security Network Association
(RSNA) [2] for confidentiality and integrity of data widely known
as Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) and WPA2. It provides secure
communication at the cost of inconvenience of obtaining and entering
the password (pre-shared key or PSK).
In this paper, we propose Secure Open AP (SOAP) which enables
a client and an AP to establish a secure connection without the prior
knowledge of a password. Motivations of this work are three-fold:
First, it is desirable to make free and public Wi-Fi connections secure.
Second, captive portals, typically adopted in airports, coffee shops,
etc, appear to offer secure connections with a login page and legal
notices. However, they mostly use OSA and do not adequately warn
that the communication is not protected [3], [4]. Third, authentication
and security go hand in hand in Wi-Fi security algorithms. SOAP
separates the two and thus, allows an AP to require no authentication
but to provide message protection for each connected client.
To this end, SOAP adopts two public key algorithms, a key
agreement algorithm and a digital signature algorithm [5]. First,
without the loss of generality, the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key
exchange algorithm (ECDH) is used to agree on a PSK. The elliptic
curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) is adopted to prevent a
possible man-in-the-middle attack. Along with it, SOAP introduces
a new information element (IE) and frame format which conform
to the standard and do not interfere SOAP-unaware legacy devices.
Experiment results show that SOAP increases the connection delay
by no more than 22 percent given the parameters used for the im-
plementation. This is mainly due to the increased management frame
size and the additional handshake messages but is not significant
considering the benefit of clients’ security and convenience.
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TABLE I: IEEE 802.11 security algorithms
Security class
in IEEE 802.11 Authentication
Message
Protection Comment
Pre-RSNA OSA N/A
Convenient
but no protection
SKA WEP
Some protection
but found vulnerable
(obsolete now)
RSNA
(since
802.11i-2004)
WPA/WPA2-EAP Used in an enterpriseenvironment with AS
WPA/WPA2-PSK
Used in open, public areas,
Requires a client
to enter a password
Plaintext
Client AP
Beacon (or Probe Response)
Authentication
(Request and Response)
Association
(Request and Response)
Data communication
Fig. 1: Open System Authentication procedure, which is null authentication
and does not provide data protection
This paper is organized as follows: Section II briefly explains
authentication and security algorithms in the IEEE 802.11 standard.
Section III explains the proposed mechanism, SOAP. Section IV
examines its performance and finally we will conclude this study
in section V.
II. PRIMER
The IEEE 802.11 standard defines two classes of security algo-
rithms, pre-RSNA and RSNA algorithms as shown in table I.
Pre-RSNA includes Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) for message
protection, and OSA and Shared Key Authentication (SKA) for entity
authentication. While SKA can be used if WEP has been selected,
both are obsolete due to their vulnerabilities and inefficiencies. An
AP in an OSA (fig. 1) mode allows any client to connect to it without
verification of its legitimacy.
In RSNA, WPA can establish a secure connection between a
client and an AP if and only if a client provides a valid user’s
membership information (WPA-EAP mode), or if a client provides
a correct password, PSK (WPA-PSK mode). The former is used in,
for example, companies or universities using an authentication server
(AS) such as RADIUS. The latter is used in personal or open, small-
scale public areas. WPA-PSK establishes a connection between a
client and an AP and derives a shared cryptographic key (pairwise
transient key or PTK) using an identical password, PSK. This is
accomplished via the 4-Way Handshake as illustrated in fig. 2.
Prior to the 4-Way Handshake, a client and an AP negotiate
WPA parameters by exchanging a Probe Response (PRRP), a Beacon
(BCN), and an Association Request (ASSOCREQ) frame. Note that
the WPA-PSK procedure in fig. 2 begins with null authentication
ar
X
iv
:1
71
1.
02
29
3v
4 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 29
 N
ov
 20
17
JOURNAL NAME 2
WPA 4-Way Handshake
Client AP
Beacon (BCN), or Probe Response (PRRP)
Announces WPA/WPA2-PSK capability
Authentication
(Request and Response)
Association Request (ASSOCREQ)
Announces which WPA scheme client will use
Association Response
A password (PSK) is 
set at startup
ANonce = random()
EAPOL-Key Message 1
Sends ANonce
SNonce = random()
Derive PTK=PRF(PSK, 
ANonce, SNonce, AP 
MAC, client MAC)
EAPOL-Key Message 2
Sends SNonce, MIC
Derive PTK,
check MIC integrity
EAPOL-Key Message 3
Sends client a command 'Install PTK', GTK, and MIC
EAPOL-Key Message 4
Sends MIC
Derive GTK
Data communication
A user inputs a 
password (PSK)
Plaintext Encrypted
Fig. 2: The WPA-PSK procedure. (An AP sets a PSK at the configuration
time and a client should enter an identical PSK to authenticate and derive a
PTK.)
SOAP Handshake
WPA 4-Way Handshake follows
Client AP
Beacon (BCN), or Probe Response (PRRP)
Announces SOAP capability,
and ECDH parameters and pubAP
Authentication
(Request and Response)
Association Request (ASSOCREQ)
Announces whether cl ient wil l use SOAP scheme,
which ECDH parameter will  be used, and pubclient
Association Response
Generate ECDSA 
private and public keys
Initialize e lliptic curve 
group parameters
(p, a, b, ge, n, h)
SOAP Message 1
Sends be, and signature(be, PRIVclient)
A = random_int()
ae = geA
B = random_int()
be = geB
Ver ify signature of be
PSKSOAP = hbeA
Ver ify signature of ae
PSKSOAP = haeB
SOAP Message 2
Sends ae, and signature(ae, PRIVAP)
Initialize e lliptic curve 
group parameters
SOAP is configured at 
star tup and
generate ECDSA 
private and public keys
A user will  choose 
whether to use SOAP
Fig. 3: The SOAP procedure. (Contrary to the existing WPA-PSK in fig. 2, a
PSK is agreed on using the SOAP Handshake without a user input.)
(OSA) but it additionally provides a stronger authentication during
the 4-Way Handshake by proving knowledge of a shared password.
More specifically, the 4-Way Handshake is triggered by the AP, which
uses Extensible Authentication Protocol over LAN (EAPOL) [6].
With a PSK configured at startup on the AP side and given by a
user input on the client side, a PTK is derived from a PSK, SNonce,
and ANonce on both sides. The identity is assessed by checking
the MIC, authenticating the client. After the 4-Way Handshake,
messages between the client and the AP are conveyed as encrypted.
As described above, a PTK cannot be derived unless a client and an
AP have a common priori knowledge.
III. SECURE OPEN AP
This paper aims for a user to be able to conveniently connect to
an AP in a WPA-PSK mode without having to enter a password.
SOAP uses two public key algorithms, ECDH and ECDSA, prior to
the 4-Way Handshake to agree on a PSK on both sides so that the
handshake can use it for the 4-Way Handshake as shown in fig. 3.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the SOAP Handshake.
Algorithm 1 SOAP Handshake
Inputs
{pub, PRIV }{client,AP}: ECDSA public/private keys of a client
and an AP
Output: a shared secret key PSKSOAP
1: Exchange ECDH groups and ECDSA public keys via PRRP/BCN,
and ASSOCREQ
2: Negotiate an ECDH group G (algorithm 2)
3: Initialize an ECDH generator (primitive element) ge
4: Generate ECDH private keys(
Client : A = random_int()
AP : B = random_int() , 1 ≤ A, B ≤ p − 1
5: Generate ECDH public keys
Client : ae = geA AP : be = geB
6: Exchange ae and be with their signature via SOAP Message 1/2
7: Agree on a shared secret(
Client : PSKSOAP = hbeA
AP : PSKSOAP = haeB
= hgeAB
A. SOAP Information Element and Elliptic Curve Negotiation
In fig. 3, a client and an AP first negotiate whether they will use
SOAP, and if so, which elliptic curve they will use. Such information
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is conveyed via a newly introduced IE1, SOAP IE, which is included
in the frame body of a PRRP, a BCN and an ASSOCREQ and is
defined as in fig. 4. Element ID is set to 251 which is a reserved value
and is not used in the current standard. Group count m represents the
number of available elliptic curve groups and Group list is a list of
1-octet long integer identifiers representing elliptic curve groups.
Element
ID Length
Information
Group
count
(m)
Group
list
ECDSA
key
size (s)
ECDSA
public
key
Octets 1 1 1 m 1 s
Fig. 4: SOAP IE
The AP first announces a set of available elliptic curve groups,
GAP , via a SOAP IE included in a PRRP/BCN. Upon receiving
a PRRP/BCN, the client having its own supported set of groups,
Gclient , (i) computes a common set G∩ = GAP∩Gclient , (ii) selects
G among the set with the largest key size , i.e., the highest security
level, and (iii) sends it back to the AP via a SOAP IE included in an
ASSOCREQ.
ECDH group negotiation can be summarized as algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 ECDH group negotiation
Inputs
G{client,AP}: A set of ECDH groups available on each side
Output
G: A negotiated ECDH group
1: An AP sends a PRRP/BCN to a client with GAP
2: Client : G∩ = GAP ∩Gclient
3: if G∩ =  then . WPA-PSK mode
4: The client requires a user to enter a password
5: The client sends an ASSOCREQ to the AP without G
6: else . SOAP mode
7: The client selects G with the largest key size among G∩
8: The client sends ASSOCREQ to with G to the AP
9: end if
B. SOAP Handshake and Message Formats
After ECDH group negotiation is completed, the client and the
AP first initializes ECDH machines with the negotiated group G
and generates their own private keys A, B and public keys ae, be,
respectively. The client and the AP exchange their ECDH public
keys via SOAP Message 1 and 2. The AP sends its ECDH public
key with its signature via a SOAP Message 1 to the client. Receiving
the SOAP Message 1, the client sends ae and its signature via a
SOAP Message 2 back to the AP. After exchanging and verifying a
SOAP Message from each other, the client and the AP must be able
to agree on a PSKSOAP . And the AP triggers the 4-Way Handshake
and both use PSKSOAP instead of PSK during the handshake.
Frame body of SOAP Message 1 and 2 is defined as shown in
fig. 5. Like an EAPOL-Key frame used in the 4-Way Handshake, a
link layer control (LLC) header is prepended to SOAP Message 1
and 2 so that they are routed in a different reception and processing
path than a normal data frame. In other words, a SOAP Message is
a variant of an EAPOL-Key frame. Protocol version and packet type
are currently set to 0xff which is a reserved value and is not used
in the current IEEE 802.1X standard. The EAPOL header is followed
1 Note that BCN, PRRP, or ASSOCREQ are management frame subtypes.
The frame body of a management frame consists of IEs, format of which
is a 1 octet Element ID (EID) field, a 1 octet Length field, and a variable
length element-specific Information field. Predefined elements are SSID (EID
0), Supported Rates (EID 1), TIM (EID 5), etc.
EAPOL header Packet body
Protocol
version
Packet
type
Packet
body
length
ECDH
public
key
ECDSA
signature
Octets 1 1 2 variable variable
Fig. 5: Frame body of a SOAP Message.
by ECDH public key and its signature, whose lengths are determined
by the previous negotiation process.
Note that messages for the SOAP Handshake are signed with the
ECDSA private keys as mentioned earlier. The SOAP IE in fig. 4
contains an ECDSA public key of a sender (the client or the AP)
to be used in the SOAP Handshake. It is used to sign the SOAP
messages. SHA-256 is used for digestion. The client and the AP can
verify the authenticity of a counterpart with the signature.
IV. EVALUATION
A. Feasibility and Applicability
1) Implementation: We implemented SOAP on a Linux laptop.
Kernel versions of 3.13 and 4.4, and Atheros AR9565 Wi-Fi NIC
supporting IEEE 802.11b/g/n are used for evaluation. Most Linux
distributions use wpa_supplicant as a backend daemon for a
WPA client. We modified it to implement SOAP on a client side. Note
that wpa_supplicant operates in user space, and can be used on
other operating systems, and thus exhibits great applicability. For an
evaluation purpose, SOAP is implemented using hostapd on an AP
side. Both a client and an AP support 224-bit (28-octet) long key for
both ECDH and ECDSA. The implementation is publicly accessible
via [7].
2) Coexistence with legacy devices: First, according to the stan-
dard, an IE with an unknown element ID in a management frame shall
be discarded silently and it does not produce any side effect (BCN,
PRRP, or ASSOCREQ implementing SOAP). Second, while a SOAP
Message is an EAPOL-Key frame variant with an invalid EAPOL
header, it shall not be generated unless a SOAP IE is exchanged prior
to the SOAP Handshake. Even if it is transmitted by misbehavior, a
SOAP-unaware device shall discard it silently, too. Note that a SOAP-
aware client and AP also can establish a connection using a legacy
WPA-PSK mode.
B. Security Analysis
Since SOAP relies on the solid foundations of ECDH and ECDSA,
a SOAP-capable client and AP are able to securely agree on a PSK.
This section enumerates potential threats to SOAP and presents the
corresponding security analysis as shown in table II.
In the table, the vulnerability due to message injection and mas-
querading are inherited from OSA. A client may connect with a rogue
AP and is allowed a DoS attack and privacy leakage. We expect it
can be resolved by obtaining ECDSA keys being managed globally
for trustful APs, which is analogous to HTTPS certificates. Another
vulnerability of connection hijacking can be caused by injecting a
disassociation frame before SOAP handshake, which applies to WPA
in the same manner. Note that it cannot hijack a connection (session),
and only can disconnect a client from an AP. This can be resolved if
management frames are also signed and verified with ECDSA keys.
C. Network Performance Analysis
1) Connection establishment delay: An extra delay due to the
SOAP Handshake is inevitable. We measure the time taken to
establish a secure connection between a client and an AP. The delay
is measured on an AP side, and is defined by a time interval from
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TABLE II: Security analysis of SOAP
Threat or criterion Security analysis (3: Secure, 7: Vulnerable, å: Possible solution)
Ephemeral PSKSOAP 3 Ephemeral PSKSOAP is obtained at every new SOAP handshake
Elliptic curve key size 3 224-bit elliptic curve is acceptable until 2022 or later [8], [9]
Acitve/passive eavesdropping 3 PSKSOAP remains secret owing to confidentiality property of ECDH
Message replaying 3 Properly implemented SOAP state machine can prevent replay attack by discarding replayed frames
Message deletion and interception 3 It can cause DoS but requires techniques such as jamming which apply to all other Wi-Fi communication
Message injection 7 It can cause DoS if PRRQ, PRRP and BCN containing an incorrect ECDSA public key are injected
å It can be filtered by blacklisting a device with repetitive ECDSA verification failure
Masquerading (MAC/SSID spoofing) 7 Vulnerable as OSA if a client and an AP accept PRRQ, PRRP and BCN frames from an attacker
å Once correct ECDSA public keys are exchanged, masquerading has no effect
Connection hijacking 7 An attacker can disconnect a client from an AP by sending a disassociation frame, causing DoS
å But it cannot hijack due to the attacker has a different ECDSA public key
å Disassociation can be prevented if management frames are signed and verified with ECDSA
when an Association Response frame is sent and to when an EAPOL-
Key Message 4 is sent. hostapd is modified to measure time of
each event in microsecond precision. It is measured 1,000 times,
plotted and compared in fig. 6. The mean extra delay caused by the
SOAP Handshake is 3.65 ms, which corresponds to approximately 22
percent higher delay compared to the 4-Way Handshake (WPA-PSK).
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Fig. 6: Cumulative probability of connection establishment delay. (Mean delay
is 16.44 ms and 20.09 ms without and with SOAP scheme, respectively. Mean
difference is 3.65 ms and it corresponds to approximately 22 percent additional
time delay.)
Note that this delay is only involved when a client and an AP
attempt to establish a connection. Hence the impact of additional
delay due to SOAP is trivial.
2) Network Overhead: Overheads of a SOAP IE and a SOAP
Message are measured and compared in fig. 7. It is assumed that a
client and an AP support one common ECDH group and use a 224-
bit elliptic curve as discussed earlier, thus m = 1 and s = 28 in fig. 4,
and a SOAP IE occupies 33 bytes, where ECDSA Public key field
takes up a major portion (28 octets; 85 percent). It corresponds to
up to 24 percent of overhead as shown in fig. 7a. Adding another
ECDH group to the IE only takes up 1 more octet.
Size of a SOAP Message is calculated as the sum of ECDH key
size and ECDSA signature size, which is double of ECDSA key
size. Assuming ECDH and ECDSA use an 224-bit elliptic curve, a
SOAP Message is 148 bytes long including a MAC header, while an
EAPOL-Key frame is 195 bytes long as shown in fig. 7b.
V. CONCLUSION
Motivated by the need of open but secure Wi-Fi communication,
this paper proposes SOAP, which renders a client and an AP to
securely agree on a PSK using two public key algorithms as an ex-
tension of WPA-PSK. The proposed scheme adopts a key agreement
algorithm, ECDH and a digital signature algorithm, ECDSA for that
purpose.
We expect that SOAP can secure a public Wi-Fi network without
introducing inconvenience for a provider and a consumer, and also
that it can be used to construct a secure IoT network with automated
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Fig. 7: Frame length evaluation
process. We further think SOAP can be extended to use a certificate
instead of a simple public key algorithm and signature to manage
and assess a trusted public AP in a global scale against a rogue AP.
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